

Review

Weak Notion of Animal Rights: A Critical Response to Feinberg and Warren' Conceptions

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The primary aim of this paper is to defend the idea that nonhuman animals have got equal rights to life. Some proponents of animal rights hold the view that nonhuman animals have the right to life, but at the same time, they adhere to the perception that the value assigned to a nonhuman animal's life is much lower than that of human beings. This notion can be found in the works of Feinberg and Warren who have developed the idea of animal's right to live. Both proponents agree that the other animals have weak rights to life. This paper attempts to show that the supporters of this argument have failed to explore adequately the view as why animals' value to life is lower when compared to humans' life. Here, the conceptions of these two authors in favour of weak notions of nonhuman animal rights are carefully scrutinized.

Keywords: Right to life, moral status, great apes, equal rights.

INTRODUCTION

Does an animal have any rights to life? During the last few two decades, a number of theories relevant to this issue made attempts to address this question. A consensus exists in most of the philosophical tenets that the act of killing or causing suffering to animals is *prima facie* wrong because they have the right to life (Singer, 1975, 1979, Regan, 1983). Different theories such as utilitarianism, virtue ethics, contractarianism, and rights theory reach this conclusion in their respective ways. For example, the Kantian and contractarian traditions reach their conclusion through anthropocentric value-based means. The Kantian traditions hold that an act of cruelty towards an animal can reflect the worst of humans (Rowlands, 1998). The contractarian traditions shows that human beings are indirectly concerned about animals as it is due to the respect for the feelings of the human rational agents that animals should not be treated cruelly (Rowlands, 1998). The utilitarian tradition proposes the idea that any sort of suffering is intrinsically wrong (Singer, 1975). Additionally, biocentric ethical views tend to grant direct value to animals (Taylor, 1983). Moreover, there are nowadays a growing social movement towards the defense of nonhuman animal right to life.

Tom Regan (1983) one of the most prominent pioneers of the animal right's movement

sustain that "all beings that are subjects-of-life — whether or *not they are human* — have moral rights; and all of them have the same basic moral rights" (Marry Warren, 2007: 107). However, other authors argue that nonhuman animals have got the right to life, but not in a strong sense; they have the right to life in a weak sense. This line of thought can be found in the works of Joel Feinberg (1974, 1980) and Mary Anne Warren (2007).

If it is claimed that animals have got the right to life, what would be the consequences of such right when it comes to the point of conflict of interest between nonhuman animals and humans? Another important question is — which interest will get preference? Is the human, or the nonhuman animal interest that prevails? This paper explores the perspectives of this problematic by analyzing the concept of right to life. In order to clarify those questions, I start by laying out the characteristics of the concept of animal rights to life. This examination consists of a brief analysis of the central aspects around the notion of animal-rights. In the third and fourth sections of this article, I demonstrate that the arguments offered by Feinberg and Warren have failed to give provide any sort of justification in this regard.

Methodology and clarification of the concepts

This is a text-based analytical study. The texts that form the basis of the analysis are articles and monographs published in between 1960-2007. As a meta-ethical study, this article focuses on basic ethical conceptions such as 'right to life' and 'moral status' of nonhuman animals. For this clarity, the descriptive, comparative, and critical analyses are performed through the work. The critical analysis is based on a number of criteria of evaluation and focuses on disadvantages of animal rights theory proposed by Marry Anne Warren and Joel Feinberg.

Intellectual writings in different books, journals and research papers on related to animal and environmental moral issues are used to furnish the conceptual framework of the study. Books, journals, and research papers are available on various issues related to the animal and environmental ethics.

Clarification of the conceptions

Throughout the article, the term 'nonhuman animal' is not referred ant, butterfly, bird, flies, lethal organism, bee, insects, fish, crabs and so on, rather, I used the term 'nonhuman animals' that are possessing nervous systems, rudimentary behavior, as well as bodily systems and have feelings of pain and sufferings. For example, food animals or farms animals (cow, ox, pig, goat, lamb etc.), companion animals (dog, cat), circus animals (elephant, monkey, and chimpanzee), zoo animals (tiger, lion, snake, horse, bear, and lion) and so on are treated as nonhuman animals.

The Right to Life of Nonhuman Animals

In this section, I will clarify the term 'right to life of animals'. In order to better understanding of this concept, I will address the answer to the question: Which criteria determine the right to life of nonhuman animals? Particularly, what factors are required for having one's right to life? It has been claimed that any entity's right to life depends on its *capacity* (Bekoff and Pierce, 2009.). Here, *capacity* refers to "capacity of free choices", 'capacity to reason', 'consciousness' and 'rationality' (DeGrazia, 1996). Nevertheless the criteria of capacity do not apply equally to all humans. Examples of *past persons* (according to Warren, past persons are those people who have become disabled due to any dangerous disease or accident.), potential persons, (*i.e.* infants and children) (Warren, 1997: 205-208), people with advanced forms of autism, and in marginal cases those who do not have any capacity, but their full right to life depend on the basis of human rights principles. Full capable humans do not wantonly cause them suffering. Likewise, they tend to

avoid the use of those other humans for scientific purposes. This example is sufficient *per se* to show that full capacity is not the necessary criterion to have the right to life. Similarly, we can argue that the nonhuman animals lack of capacity does not imply that they have no equal right to life.

While considering only capacity, rational agency and the ideas connected with Kantian personhood, it is not plausible to draw nonhuman animals towards the right to life. Philosophers like Paul Shapiro have shown that at least there are some animals who have a similar moral capacity like the one the rational agents, *i.e.*, human have (Shapiro, 2006.). Tom Reagan contests the notion that moral status depends on the possession of rational capacity, personhood, intelligence, or autonomy (Warren, 1997: 68, 110). In this sense, how it is possible to stand that animals have got the right to life? A concept that can be useful to understand this question is the 'interest to live' the approach proposed by Alasdair Cochrane (2007). The notion of 'Interest to live' encloses different aspects:

Firstly, both humans and nonhuman animals have got an inclination to avoid pain. The act of avoiding pain is a common trait to of all living beings. The utilitarian philosophers are favourable with this view (Singer, 1975, 1979). They advocate that sentient beings feel experiences of pain and pleasure, and therefore, they have "strong interest" in no feel any suffering (Singer, 1978: 122, 1979: 79-81). Pain, whether it is strong or weak, does not matter to a being. Pain itself is always pain and the consequences of it are always any sort of suffering (Singer, 1978, Nelson, 1956: 99). Peter Singer also believes that pain is pain, no matter who is experiencing it (Singer, 1995: 2-17). For example, if we slap a goat or a dog, they will not remain irresponsive to this injurious act. Either they will move, or bark, or will show a physical reaction becoming apparent that they feel pain from the slap.

Secondly, it can be said that they have the right to life, because a pig, a goat, or a human are capable of understanding their pain equally or in a range of certain degrees (Regan, 1983: 240). If a cow or a human were harmed with a stick, both of them will feel pain. Humans have particular cognitive capacities to receive and perceive the pain immediately. Nonetheless, does a nonhuman animal feel the pain in the same manner a human does? For example: if any human suffering with a terminal illness and experiencing a great amount of unrelieved-pain, or if s/he enters into such a condition in which s/he is not capable of having desires for life, s/he can lose his/her "interest to live". However, if any animal is injured severely, or if it enters into a permanent vegetative state, would it lose interest to live? Moreover, is any nonhuman animal able to realize its own condition? If the answer is 'no', is it possible to conclude that a nonhuman animal's right to life is similar to a human?

In this regard, I would like to cite another example from Alasdair Cochrane (2007: 298). Let's imagine the following situation. A person and his companion dog have got their legs broken due to an accident, which causes them suffering. Will this incident bring together the same values to the person and the dog? The person can take remedial means which can remove his/her suffering. Yet, if the dog has got no cognitive capacity and aim-project it is expected that the dog will suffer more. Hence, does this-mean that the "right to life" is not equal to humans and nonhuman animals? It is recognized that humans have extra-advantages (Kellert, 1993: 42-43). However, it does not mean that suffering is either desirable for a human or a nonhuman animal. It is undesirable for both. From a nonhuman animal perspective, life appears to be very bad when its lived in pain. A nonhuman animal experience of suffering is equivalent to that of a human (Singer, 1978: 120-122, 1979: 80-81). Thus, a nonhuman animal's strength of avoiding pain is therefore similar to that of a human.

Warren and Feinberg Conceptions on the Right to life

Feinberg and Warren propose that the value of nonhuman animals is much lesser than that of humans (Feinberg, 1980 & Warren, 1997.). The weak notion in their approach lies on the *good reason* conception. Feinberg holds the view that animals have the right to not be killed without any *good reason* (Feinberg, 1980: 194.). In a similar manner, Warren considers that "living organisms are not to be killed or otherwise harmed, without *good reasons*..." (Warren, 2007: pp.50, 84, 149).

Both authors agree that humans can kill nonhuman animals for food, clothes, shelter, or to protect their property rights. This conception implies that it is permissible to give them pain, torment them or kill them, according to the human interest. Hence, the notion of *good reason* reveals only the human interest. However, our proposed idea of "equal rights to life" — does not encompass the kill ability of a nonhuman animal in any exceptional circumstances. My view is different from the one defended by Joel Feinberg and Marry Anne Warren in at least two ways: (i) I support the view that nonhuman animals have 'equal right to life'; (ii) in any conflicting situation a nonhuman animal "interest to live" is no less than a human's "interest to live". I propose therefore, that in any conflicting situation humans should not kill other animals.

Besides, why do Feinberg and Warren defend the view that nonhuman animals do not have "equal rights to life"? In this regard, a new question arises: What is the justification of *good reason* for viewing that nonhuman animals have only right to life in a weak sense? The authors offer an answer to this question in a divergent way although, reaching the same conclusion. Their interpretation of *good reason* encompasses the following

ideas "at any reasonable cost and order of priority" (Feinberg, 1980: 202), *conflicting problems* (Warren, 1997: 209), and *degrees of properties* (Warren, 1997: 148-177).

Feinberg states that animals have minimal value to life, which is lesser than that of human beings (Feinberg, 1980: 202-203). He further suggests that non-human animals that possess rights also require to have interest. Interests include conscious wishes, hopes, impulses, desires, directions of growth, natural fulfilment, aims and goals, which are absent in nonhuman *animals* (Feinberg, 1980 : 165-166). Therefore, in his opinion, nonhuman animals have no right to life; they have a weak right to life (Carl Cohen and et.al. 2001, Marc Sagoff, 2001, and J. Baird Callicott 2001). While drawing this conclusion, Feinberg added another associate principle: "equal or strong right to life requires equal value to life for human beings" (Feinberg, 1980: 198-199). He also contends that nonhuman animals have no equal right to life because they also have lesser value.

It's possible to find similar ideas in Warren's notion of "the relevance of relationship" (Warren, 1997: 122-147) and "multi-criterial approach" (Warren, 1997:148-164). While speaking about the notion of "relevance of relationship", Warren argues that there is a degree of moral status regarding the properties (Warren, 1997: 122). She believes that both intrinsic and relational properties play important roles in shaping our legitimate attributions of moral status (Warren, 1997:146). We do not only look upon moral status on the basis of intrinsic properties, but also on relational properties (Warren, 1997: 22, 88,130). Depending upon the intrinsic and relational properties, some moral statuses are stronger than others. As with special relation to humans, domestic animals would have stronger status than that of wild animals [Consult Arluke and Sanders about the sociozoological scale.]. So, if humans have the option to kill either a domestic animal or a wild animal, they will choose the latter because they also not have relational contact with wild animals.

In my consideration, her 'multi-criterial' (Warren, 1997: chap.6) approach to moral status is also a representation of a weak sense of moral right to life. She claims that: "only a multi-criterial account of moral status can incorporate the sound ethical considerations that underlie each of the uni-criterial accounts..." (Warren, 1997: 177).

The multi-criterial views strongly recommend that in a conflicting situation the interest of a human (usually the moral agent) will get priority. She explains, "moral agency logically entails the possession of full moral status" (Warren, 1997:156). And, the being with full moral status will come first and it will have "full and equal basic moral rights" (Warren, 1997:156-7), compared to other beings with less moral status. As Warren states that "[h]uman beings who are capable of sentience but not of moral agency have the same moral rights as do *full* moral agents" (Warren, 1997: 164). At the same time, she

claims more emphatically: “the social, psychological, and biological realities of human existence that require that basic rights not be restricted to human beings who are capable of moral agency” (Warren, 1997:164).

According to Warren, an infant does not have any cultural, social or moral properties. Instead, she claims that infants can jointly ensure “instinct, reason and culture” (Warren, 1997:165). Human beings who are born with less intellectual capacity and who have become physically incapable due to critical diseases, they should have also intrinsic value, in this case ‘*empathy*’ would be the source of value (Warren, 1997: 165-66). But, why she does not include *empathy* for a nonhuman animal? Similarly to Feinberg’s perspective, Warren does not take into consideration a nonhuman animal’s equal right to life. Rather, she emphasizes only the importance of ‘moral agency’ and their interest in life and their act of living (Warren, 1997: 72, 206).

There are many sources of value, but all these sources are different in nature and in several degrees. If we take into account degrees of value, beings with higher values should get priority. As a moral agent humans will get priority over a nonhuman animal. As a conscious being, a nonhuman animal will get priority over a less-consciousness or non-conscious being (Warren, 1997 :44). From this standpoint Warren concludes that if a being has more *strength*, it will have stronger right to life. On the other hand, less strength of properties implies less right to life. That does mean that nonhuman animals have less right to life.

A Critical Response to Feinberg and Warren

As I have stated in the previous section that Feinberg and Warren think that a nonhuman animal have minimal value to life, and which is lower than a human. We can now raise the question: Why does a nonhuman animal life have less value than that of a human? In particular, there several exceptions one can find in marginal cases where the value to life is not equal to become the strength of the right to life. In the case of infants, those who are ‘demented’ human or mentally different, biologically obstructed, intellectually, mentally and physically incapable, are not equal to neurotypic humans (Anderson, 2004: 280-281). Those human *others* cannot claim any right due to their variance of capacities. Does this variance in the value of life indicate that marginal human beings have lesser value to life, compared to other neurotypic humans? If this is the case, the problem gets back to the same basic issue as it arises in the case of nonhuman animals. It is also true in the case of marginal humans, which are lacking of capacities, or having a lower degree in possessing these neurotypical traits. The argument that the value to life for marginal humans is lesser than that of a neurotypical human. It also implies that the value to life for those marginal

human others is equal and similar to the values to life of some sophisticated nonhuman animals, such as great apes. However, in reality, we cannot disown equal rights to life of human beings. But, according to Feinberg and Warren’s position, nonhuman beings should get less priority than a sophisticated nonhuman beings.

Warren (1997) and Feinberg (1980), both the proponents emphasize that our duties must prioritize any beings on the basis of its closeness. In real life, according to Feinberg, nonhuman animals are less close to us and hence, their right to life is not as strong as that of humans. The same author also thinks that these points need further analysis. In what sense humans are closer? In many societies of the world, nonhuman animals considered as pets, seem to be very close to humans. So, how do Feinberg and Warren’s priority principles work here? Among the *Homo sapiens* history, there are constant reports of holocaust, violence, and war. In this optic does *closeness* make any sense to the right to life? Feinberg’s *argument of predation* (Feinberg, 1980 : 198-199) and Warren’s argument of *rodent* conflict (Warren, 1997 : 116-117) also reveal that nonhuman animals’ right to life is not equal to humans’ right to life.

Feinberg argues that the notion of “right to life” requires not only the act of saving the life of human, but also to refrain from being killed by others “at any reasonable cost” (Feinberg, 1980 :199). If we think that nonhuman animals have a right to life, it would be our humane duty to intervene in the wild to refrain the animals from killing acts of other animals (Feinberg, 1980 : 199). But, in reality, it is quite impossible to save the lives of animals from other animals.

On the other hand, Warren states that one cannot follow the principle of equal right to life in the case of nonhuman animals, because we have foreseeable conflicts with a number of animals during the life course making impracticable to assure them equal rights to life without sacrificing the human basic interests. She also mentions an example of “rodents”, who carry infectious pathogens that can harm or kill human beings (Warren, 1997: 116-117). In the environment, some rodents can spread lethal diseases, and contaminate food. In Warren’s perception, rodents are a serious threat to the health of human (Warren, 1997: 116-117). According to her, if humans tolerate the presence of rodents in their houses after taking into consideration their right to life, humans, ultimately, will face a disaster. In this situation, according to Warren, it is justifiable to kill those dangerous rodents in order to preserve human’s life. She states that an ethical theory will not be accepted “if its implementation would severely jeopardize human lives and health” (Warren, 1997:117). By giving an example of rodent nature, Warren provides us with the argument that it is justifiable to kill some nonhuman animals.

Moreover, in Feinberg assessment most of the environmentalists assume that predation is an essential system of a wild ecosystem. They sustain that elimination

of predation would be disastrous for both predators and prey (Feinberg, 1997: 202). If the system of predation is prevented, it would be cases of misery and lesser life (Pluhar, 1995). Any sort of human interference with natural predation is warranted to cause serious ecosystemic disturbances [REF.]. Natural predation is a system that it is vital to stability, integrity, and aesthetical beauty of natural ecosystems (Pluhar, 1995: 82). Thus, the claim to refrain the act of killing other animals is grounded on the lack of their ecological knowledge.

Furthermore, I think, Warren's analogy of "rodent conflict" is not sufficient enough to prove the strength of right to life. It appears that probably she has drawn a wrong analogy to construct her arguments. In fact, *human conflict* and *rodent conflict* are different from each other. In the rodent conflict, life-risk pathogens develop in the body of the affected host, and therefore rodents cannot be directly condemned by that causality. Rodents have no ability to understand if they are harmful to human's life or not. They are not even capable of communicating to humans. For the sake of human's life well-being, humans kill them, because of their "existence and mode of life" (Warren, 2007: 116) human life can be endangered. On the other hand, if we imagine conflicts within and among humans, we are also able to imagine the context in which they are based on, and hence, is it permissible to kill human beings? This analogy can be explored by citing the following example:

Let's suppose that a group of scientists has discovered in the laboratory a kind of bio-organism, which is poisonous. The bio-organism is a threat to humans not in the immediate future, but in a long course of time. The group of scientists is quite serious about their commitment, but they have neither considered the well-being of the mankind, nor the massive consequence of their production. And, in reality, there is no other alternative means, such as non-lethal or non-harmful ways of overcoming this threat. In such situation, to save the lives of a large number of people to kill the group of scientists becomes acceptable. This act of killing these scientists would appear to be the human feasible way of survival. Can we compare this situation with the analogy regarding the "disease-spreading rodents"? Or, is it justifiable to kill the scientists in order to protect a large number of people?

If we fail to resolve the conflict with other humans in any other non-lethal or non-harmful way, will we use violent means, such as killing, to protect human life? Or, will we think about any non-violent, non-harmful alternative? In this situation, we have an alternative not to kill them (as Warren suggests). But, in the case of conflicts with nonhuman animals, Warren does not admit such an alternative. We would consider that if any of the reasons, whether it is immediate or non-immediate, endangers our life, and, because we cannot overcome the crisis through any of the possible ways, it will be justifiable to harm or kill the being whether it is

a nonhuman or human animal.

Let us suppose that in any of these cases the threat is not immediate or nobody will die if no protection measure is taken. Nevertheless, both groups of being will be a life-threatening issue if we do not adopt any protective measures. There is no absolute solution in a conflict between two groups of human beings. We cannot prevent both threats through any non-lethal or non-harmful way. So, Warren's conception is based on a contradictory and weak notion of nonhuman animal rights.

Towards an Alternative

I have argued that Warren and Feinberg's notions of nonhuman animal rights to life are not convincing. I agree with the notion of "equal right to life" contesting the notion of *weak right to life*. Why should we defend animals' equal right to life? Life is life, whether it is the life of a human being or anyone else (Eagleton, 2007:135-175).

In the recent past, some countries supported the 'Great Apes Project' declaration (Peter Singer and Cavalieri., 1993: 310-312.). The aim of this project is to recognize the basic rights of great apes. The declaration also asks everyone concerned to protect of gorillas, orangutans, chimpanzees, bonobos from all kind of threats. All these animals should no longer be used in laboratories, circuses, or in any other place, which causes their suffering. The promoters of *The 'Great Apes Project'* have stated that apes should be included in our "community of equals" (Cavalieri and Singer 1993: 312). They advanced proposals of three basic rights for these animals:

First, *the right to life*: Killing of individual apes should be banned, except in extreme situations when one does it for self-defense (ibid) .

Second, *protection of individual liberty*: Individuals should not be deprived of their liberty and should not be locked anywhere. They could be locked only if their movement disturbs public safety (ibid).

Third, torture of animals, i.e., great apes, should be banned on (ibid).

Nevertheless this project is surrounded by some controversy. Currently, there are two kinds of approaches in this regard. The first perspective holds that humans must use the best types of nonhuman animals for laboratory research, but, at the same time, treat them in a much better and humane way. This idea is known as *animal welfare*. The second derives from animal rights movements that sustain that nonhuman animals and humans must be treated equally and that nonhuman animals cannot be used without justification (Cavalieri and Singer 1993: 311-312). Interestingly, both-notions of *animal welfare* and *animal rights* appear to be similar to each other. However, in practice, sometimes they are diametrically opposed to each other. Exponent of *animal*

welfare believe that animals are fighting for counterproductive; and we should try to reduce suffering and cruelty of nonhuman animal. On the other hand, animal rights activists are concerned about the animals' equal right to life (Singer, 1979). There is no good reason to think that humans are more valuable than nonhuman animals. Consequently, apes should be considered as a group of "people" sharing the same rights as humans (Cavalieri and Singer, 1993).

In an article, "Why is it Unethical to use Chimpanzees in the Laboratory?" Jane Goodall, a primatologist, has come to the conclusion that great apes have the similar capabilities like human. Her research shows that apes are both intellectually and emotionally like humans. The traits that humans have considered to be exclusive, for example, emotions, self-awareness, and imagination — are also found in great apes. However, perhaps, their sense of time, use of language, and their comprehension of concepts would not appear as the same as humans. But, in some cases, for example, the development of primates is faster than that of children belonging to *Homo sapiens*. So, the idea that apes have got only instincts and some form of consciousness seems untenable today (Goodall, 1995: 615–620).

Do this argument plea for the basic rights of nonhuman animals? If development and some other psychological traits are equal and similar in both these group of animals, the idea of freedom and the rights to life should be equally applied to both. It does imply that we should treat both human beings and animals in the same manner. It also implies that nonhuman animals have the right to life, as they are exactly the same as humans.

In defense of nonhuman animal rights to life, Regan's (Regan, 1982) view of *inherent value* can be taken as an example of strong argument. Regan has pointed out some features of *inherent value* (Regan, 1983: 152). First, the *inherent value* of something implies that nonhuman animals are independent of any other beings (ibid). Second, if any being possesses *inherent value*, it should not be treated improperly or as "value as means" (Regan, 1982:133). Unlike intrinsic value, *inherent value* distinguishes between animals and other beings. Having *inherent value* of something means nonhuman animals have "value in their own right." (Regan, 1983: 152). Only, because they have some *inherent value*, it is not justifiable to harm them just because human beings are capable of producing the greatest benefits for all (Regan, 1983 : 235-236). Regan also assumes that the only satisfactory standard of having *inherent value* is the "subject of life" (Regan, 1983: 47, 152). By using the concept of "subject of life", Regan states that if it is presumed that something has *subject of life* the objects or entities can possess lives, which also "involves more than merely being alive and more than merely being conscious" (Regan, 1983 : 135, 243). Since the *subject of life* of beings is sufficiently able to possess a

number of mental capacities, such as, perception, beliefs, memory, desires, and the sense of feelings of pain and pleasure. This concept has the:

"ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals,... a psychophysical identity over time... an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them (Regan, 1983 : 243).

Due to these capabilities, animals are a matter of *subject of life*. This notion elucidates the reason as to why animals have *inherent value*. According to Regan, those who have inherent value, they have an interest to live. Nonhuman animals have inherent value implies that they have an interest to live. In this regard, I would like to emphasize the fact that any sort of argument, whether it is the *subject of life* or the *interest to live* or the *right to live*, the value of animals entails their rights to live. Thus, if someone has rights implies some sort of responsibilities

While supporting this line of thought, I would like to explore the views of the British philosopher Roger Scruton (2000). Scruton states that "rights also imply responsibilities" in the case of nonhuman animals. We may apply the same argument in the case of humans. Nonhuman animals have certain rights and human being as a rational agent should follow norms of obligations and responsibilities towards nonhuman beings. So, the argument in favour of weak right to life made by Warren and Feinberg is not the exact defence of animal rights. We should ensure that nonhuman animals have rights as human beings enjoy their rights. In case of lack of degrees of rationality, for example, autistic children, disabled children, intelligently handicapped people, etc., we are prone to be more responsible to them. As they are characterized by their lack or inability to communicate as human beings can do, we do not remain indifferent to them. To some extent, we are more concerned about their well-being, caring, living and their matter of rights. We usually try to pay attention to their living conditions as well as their rights to live. In the same manner, we should be more responsible to nonhuman animals — their well-being and rights.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It has been contrasted that Feinberg and Warren share common views that humans and nonhuman animals have moral rights, but, their rights are rather different in degrees from those of human. These philosophers think that rationality marks a moral difference, while comparing the rights of humans with those of the nonhuman animals. However, both of them agree that among the human moral agents there is a reciprocal relationship in the case of respect of interests. But, this reciprocity does not flow from human to nonhuman animals.

The arguments put forward by Feinberg and Warren are based on an anthropocentric conception. Feinberg

argues that interest is a compound of intentionality that includes rationality, conscious wish, and impulses. All these properties are equally present in humans. Therefore, only humans enjoy 'interest'. We find similar anthropocentric argument in Warren's interpretation. She holds the view that moral status has different degrees and that the "upper limit being [is] occupied by the paradigm of a normal adult human being" (Warren, 1997: 87). She thinks that humans have interest in optimal nourishment and maximum health. So, she concludes that the act of eating meat can be regarded as something morally permissible (Warren, 1997: 233). She further states that nonhuman animals are not persons, they exist to serve the interest of human (Warren, 2007: 86). Both authors are inclined to recognize full moral rights to humans, in detriment to nonhuman animal-rights to life.

In the previous sections 3 and 4, I have discussed weak notion of nonhuman animal rights to life. The proponents of this argument have failed to explore adequately the question as to why nonhuman animals' value to life is lower than the value of human life. Feinberg and Warren have not fail to demonstrate the idea of "minimal value" for all nonhuman animals. Animals are lesser rightful to life is not a convincing argument. In response to the arguments made by Warren and Feinberg, I would mention that life is not equal for all humans. However, it does not mean that these humans have no equal right to life.

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